Presidents, Governors and the FOMC: Regional Bank leaders provide long-term stability by Tim Todd
22 SPRING 2009 • TEN
he  Federal  Reserve  has  taken 
numerous  unprecedented  steps 
over  the  past  several  months  to 
calm the nation’s financial turmoil. 
Among the most notable was the Federal Open 
Market Committee’s mid-December cut of the 
fed funds rate to almost zero.
It was an historic move that raised several 
issues, many related to policy and what steps 
the  Fed  might  take  with  no  additional  rate 
cuts  possible.  Aside  from  policy  issues,  it 
also  raised  important  questions  about  the 
FOMC and specifically the role of the regional 
Federal Reserve Bank presidents, who serve on   
the committee. 
The FOMC issues directives to the Fed’s 
open market desk to engage in trades that move 
interest rates toward the FOMC’s prescribed 
target. With that target now set effectively at 
zero for what appears to be an extended period, 
the FOMC has essentially no further authority 
to  take  additional  steps.  Any  additional 
actions  outside  of  interest  rate  moves  will 
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of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
political appointees who may or may not rely 
on the regional Bank presidents as advisors.
In its online blog “Real Time Economics” 
only  days  after  the  rate  cut,  The Wall  Street 
Journal  asked  “Does  Fed  Policy  Marginalize 
Regional Bank Presidents?” 
Some  might  logically  follow  up  with 
another question: “Does it matter?”
structure, creation  
of the fomC
The FOMC, created by the Banking Act of 
1935, is designed to reflect the unique structure 
of the Federal Reserve. The seven members of 
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors hold 
voting positions on the FOMC. Meanwhile, 
each  of  the  regional  Federal  Reserve  Bank 
presidents attends each FOMC meeting and 
participates  in  the  deliberations.  However, 
only five Federal Reserve Bank presidents vote. 
Those  slots  are  filled  by  the  New  York  Fed 
president with the other four positions rotating 
among the presidents of the 11 other Reserve 
Banks on an established schedule.
Initially,  there  was  not  agreement  about 
the structure. In debate about the creation of 
the FOMC, the initial proposal called for the 
creation  of  a  committee  of  three  governors 
and two Reserve Bank presidents. It is perhaps 
not surprising that the legislation was drafted 
primarily by Federal Reserve Board staff and 
done  without  consultation  of  the  Reserve 
Banks.
Federal Reserve Chairman Marriner Eccles 
took things a step farther, testifying before a 
House committee that he favored an even lesser 
role  for  the  Reserve  Bank  presidents.  Eccles 
supported making the Board alone responsible 
for open market operations with a committee 
of five Reserve Bank presidents serving only in 
an advisory role.    
The ensuing debate is discussed by Allan 
Meltzer in his book, “A History of the Federal 
Reserve Vol. 1.” In it, Meltzer notes the fact 
that  the  legislation  was  essentially  authored 
by  Board  staff  which  “raised  concern  about 
the  shift  in  power  that  the  bill  proposed. 
Repeatedly  Eccles  was  asked  about  the 
dangers of consolidating power over discount 
rates, reserve requirements, and open market 
operations  in  a  single  agency,  appointed  by 
the president and subject to political control. 
Congressmen  expressed  concern  about  the 
potential for inflation and the use of monetary 
expansion by the executive branch to influence 
elections.  And  the  old  issue  of  regional 
autonomy  remained.  Eccles  responded  that 
‘monetary policy is a national matter, and it 
cannot be dealt with regionally without having 
such situations as we have had in the past.’” 
Critics  said  that  the  legislation  would 
effectively end the public-private compromise 
that had been at the Federal Reserve System’s 
core since its creation in 1913. After debating 
the issue with the powerful Sen. Carter Glass 
in front of Glass’ Senate subcommittee, Eccles 
finally  relented  on  his  contention  about  the 
FOMC  and  agreed  to  accept  an  American 
Bankers  Association  proposal  that  would 
include five Reserve Bank presidents in setting 
monetary policy. Although the final bill gave 
the Board of Governors increased power and 
influence in other areas of the Federal Reserve, 
among Glass’ key accomplishments was getting 
the Reserve Bank presidents a role in setting 
monetary policy. 
The significance of that development has 
only grown over time. While the governors may 
have  wanted  to  keep  monetary  policy  solely 
within their realm of authority, the reality has 
been that the Reserve Bank presidents—and 
not the governors—have provided institutional 
stability  to  the  FOMC.  The  governorships, 
meanwhile, seem to have become much more 
vulnerable  to  change  than  officials  in  1935 
would have expected.
The governors
The  Board  of  Governors  is  considered 
a  government  agency.  The  governors  are 
nominated  by  the  president  and  confirmed The Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is made up of the Board of Governors,  
who are political appointees, and the 12 presidents of the regional Reserve Banks, who are appointed by their 
Reserve Bank’s board to serve as the Bank’s chief executive officer. The FOMC meets eights times a year to set 
monetary policy. The governors hold voting positions while five presidents vote on a rotating basis with the ex-
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by the Senate. For the FOMC, the governors 
are  expected  to  bring  the  government,  or 
public,  component  to  the  Federal  Reserve’s 
unique blend of interests. With the expectation 
that  they  will  have  broader  interests  in 
accountability, the governors hold a 7-5 voting 
majority on the FOMC.
Of the five individuals currently serving 
as Federal Reserve governors, Vice Chairman 
Donald  Kohn  has  the  longest  tenure  at 
approximately 6.75 years. He is followed by 
Chairman Bernanke, with approximately 6.25 
years of service spread over two appointments. 
Kevin  Warsh  has  slightly  more  than  three 
years of service. Elizabeth Duke was appointed 
in  August,  and  Daniel  Taruollo,  who  was 
appointed in January, is the most recent to join 
the Board. 
Two  governor  positions  remain  unfilled. 
As  it  currently  stands,  there  has  not  been 
an  FOMC  meeting  with  seven  governors 
participating  since  March  2005.  In  the  vast 
majority of meetings since that date, only five 
governors have taken part.
The regional bank presidents
The  presidents  of  the  regional  Reserve 
Banks are the other component of the FOMC. 
The presidents are selected by the boards of 
directors at their respective Reserve Banks and 
confirmed by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. 
Although  the  presidents  were  initially 
considered  the  “private”  component  of 
the  FOMC’s  public-private  structure, 
that  description  is  no  longer  appropriate. 
Of  the  nine  local  directors  who  select  the 
president,  six  are  elected  by  bankers  within 
the  respective  Federal  Reserve  District 
while  three  directors  are  appointed  by  the 
Board  of  Governors.  There  is  very  much  a 
“public”  component  to  the  regional  Bank 
president  positions.  Reserve  Bank  presidents 
participate in numerous public events and they   
gain  significant  insight  on  business  and 
banking  conditions  through  regular  contacts 
with  individuals  from  throughout  their   
respective Districts.
Of the 12 Federal Reserve Bank presidents, 
nine  have  held  their  posts  for  less  than  five 
years,  and  three  of  those  have  been  Bank 
presidents  for  less  than  two  years.  The  two 
longest-serving  FOMC  members  are  Kansas 
City Fed President Tom Hoenig, with more 
than 17 years of experience, and Minneapolis 
Fed President Gary Stern, who has held that 
position for more than 24 years.
historic perspective 
The  Federal  Reserve  governorships  were 
created  to  provide  stability  to  the  nation’s 
central bank in much the way that the justices 
serve the Supreme Court. Although governors 
do  not  have  lifetime  appointments,  their 
terms are established in a way that is designed 
to  greatly  reduce  the  potential  for  political 
influence: Except in rare occasions, they may 
serve  only  one  term,  and,  at  14  years,  the 
term is designed to extend through multiple 
presidents. Ideally, even a two-term president 
would be able to appoint only four governors.
However, in practice, that has not been   
the case. At the time President George W. Bush 
left office, all five of the then-current Federal 
Reserve  governors  were  his  appointees.  Two 
governor seats not filled by Bush were vacant, 
meaning  that  Bush  could  have,  assuming 
Senate approval, appointed all seven positions 
to the Board of Governors. 
That  multiple  appointments  would  be 
made by one president—especially a two-term 
president—is not at all unexpected or unique 
in Fed history. Virtually all Fed governors leaves 
office well before the end of their term. The 
rules restricting the length of time a Federal 
Reserve governor can serve almost never come 
into consideration. 
Looking at the 15 Fed governors appointed 
since  former  Chairman  Alan  Greenspan’s 
appointment on Aug. 11, 1987, and excluding 
current governors, the average time spent in 
office  was  5.6  years.  Removing  Greenspan’s 
18.5-year tenure from the equation lowers the 
average to 4.6 years per governor.
These  relatively  brief  tenures  in  office 
are  not  a  recent  development.  The  39  Fed   26 SPRING 2009 • TEN
governors  appointed  since  1965  averaged 
5.8  years  in  office.  Removing  Greenspan’s 
exceptionally  long  tenure  cuts  the  average 
number to 5.5 years.
Prior to 1965, Governors generally served 
much  longer  in  office,  although  even  then 
a  full  term  was  a  rarity.  The  63  Governors 
serving between the creation of the FOMC in 
1935 through Randall Kroszner’s departure in 
January held office for an average of 7.9 years. 
The longest tenure as a governor belongs to 
M.S. Szymczak, who served from June 1933 
through  May  1961.  Also  notable  is  Paul 
Volcker’s four years at the helm of the New 
York Fed before he became Fed chairman. 
Interestingly, Congress has twice extended 
the term of office for Federal Reserve governors, 
but the moves had little actual impact on how 
long the governors stayed in office. Terms were 
10  years  prior  to  the  Banking  Act  of  1933, 
which extended them to 12. The Banking Act 
of 1935 instituted the current 14-year terms.
Of  the  82  individuals  who  have  held 
appointed positions as members of the Board 
of  Governors  since  the  Fed’s  beginning  in 
1914, only nine have served 14 years or more. 
Interestingly  four  of  those  nine  had  their 
initial appointment prior to the institution of   
14-year terms. 
the  federal  open  market  committee  (fomc) 
forms  monetary  policy  to  promote  economic  growth,   
employment,  stable  prices,  and  sustainable  trade,  among 
other objectives. meetings are held at the marriner s. eccles   
federal reserve board building, pictured, in Washington, d.c.
 
The  most  recent  governor  to  complete 
a full term was Greenspan, who finished an 
unexpired term before serving his own full 14-
year term.
The tenures of the Reserve Bank presidents, 
meanwhile,  have  consistently  been  longer 
than those of the governors. Excluding those 
who held office on an interim basis and the 
current Federal Reserve Bank presidents, there 
have been 22 Federal Reserve Bank presidents 
serving  from  the  time  of  Greenspan’s  1987 
appointment through the most recently retired 
leader  at  each  Bank.  Their  average  time  in 
office is 11.6 years, or a little more than twice 
the tenure of the average governor. 
The  average  since  ’87,  however,  could 
arguably be considered to actually be a little 
longer. Gary Stern, who became president of 
the Minneapolis Fed in March 1985, was in 
office when Greenspan became chairman and 
thus is not included in the tally because he is 
currently  a  Bank  president.  Including  Stern, 
the average rises to 12.1 years. The figure also 
does not include Tom Hoenig, who has more 
than 17 years at the helm of the Kansas City 
Fed. Including both Stern and Hoenig raises 
the  average  to  12.3  years.  Conversely,  since 
Greenspan’s  appointment,  the  former  long-
time chairman is the only Fed governor who 
remained in office for more than nine years.
Going  back  further  in  Fed  history  to 
presidents serving at the time of the FOMC’s 
creation  in  1935  through  the  most  recently 
retired president at each Bank shows that the 
83  presidents,  excluding  interims  and  those 
who died in office, served an average of 10.5 
years each. 
The future
Relatively brief tenures on the FOMC will 
continue in the years to come.
Under  mandatory  retirement  rules, 
Minneapolis  Fed  President  Gary  Stern  will 
have to leave office before Nov. 3, 2009, and 
the Minneapolis Fed’s Board of Directors will 27 SPRING 2009 • TEN
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select a replacement. Even if President Obama 
filled  the  current  vacancies  on  the  Board 
of  Governors  immediately,  the  19-member 
FOMC in December 2009 will include only 
five  members  with  more  than  five  years  of 
experience.
A breakdown:
• Five members with less than one year of 
experience including three governors and New 
York Fed President William Dudley, who is the 
permanent vice chairman of the FOMC;
• Another nine members with between one 
and five years of experience;
• Four members with five to eight years of 
experience;
• One member with 18 years of experience.
On average, they will have less than four 
years of experience. That is assuming none of 
the other current governors or presidents quit 
over the next year. Based on history, that seems 
unlikely. Taking away Hoenig, they will average 
a little more than three years of experience.
Looking  further  ahead  to  2011  when 
Hoenig  will  face  mandatory  retirement,  the 
longest-serving  FOMC  member  will  be  San 
Francisco Fed President Janet Yellen, with 10 
years of experience including her time as a Fed 
governor. After Yellen would come Cleveland 
Fed President Sandy Pianalto with just more 
than eight years of experience, followed by Fed 
Chairman Ben Bernanke and Vice Chairman 
Don  Kohn  with  eight  years  each.  Eleven 
members would still have less than five years 
of  experience.  Because  of  Hoenig’s  lengthy 
tenure,  the  average  improves  comparatively 
little over two years’ time to 5.1 years of service, 
again assuming no one retires before that time, 
which,  based  on  history,  seems  extremely 
unlikely.
Under the political influence?
The  regional  Bank  presidents  are  clearly 
doing  more  than  contributing  their  regional 
perspective  to  FOMC’s  policy  deliberations. 
Aside from Greenspan, whose length of service 
is  unlikely  to  be  repeated,  it  has  been  the 
presidents who have brought the institutional 
stability  to  the  FOMC.  With  their  longer 
terms of service, they bring experience to the 
table. And with the likelihood they will remain 
in office longer, some might argue they could 
also bring a greater regard for the long-term 
consequences  of  their  actions,  as  they  will 
still  be  involved  in  policy  deliberations  in   
the future.
The  creators  of  the  FOMC,  like  the 
framers  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Act  before 
them,  recognized  the  importance  of  checks 
and balances in creating the body responsible 
for the nation’s monetary policy. The primary 
concern of Sen. Glass, who was a key author 
of the Federal Reserve Act while a congressman 
two  decades  earlier,  was  the  consolidation 
of  power  within  the  government.  Monetary 
policy,  Glass  and  others  recognized,  could 
not be solely in the hands of individuals who 
might  be  vulnerable  to  immediate  political 
considerations and not as concerned about the 
long-term ramifications of their actions.
Although the 14-year terms of governors 
were designed to provide sufficient insulation, 
the number of years served by most governors 
has  made  them  more  like  conventional 
political  appointees  than  the  Fed’s  creators 
ever intended. That does not mean they are 
politically vulnerable, only that the potential 
exists. 
Media  accounts,  such  as  The Wall  Street 
Journal blog, suggest that the regional Reserve 
Bank presidents have been marginalized in the 
current environment. It may be a few years, 
until the current crisis is well behind us, before 
it is clear how much it mattered.
To learn more about the Federal Reserve System’s 
FOMC, and to read minutes from its meetings, 
visit KansasCityFed.org/TEN.